The central role of the government in the economy and the associated high marginal tax rates mean that the problems of taxing and spending will continue to provide challenging opportunities for research in public economics.
- Feldstein (2002, p. 325) 
I. INTRODUCTION
T his paper generalizes a commonly-used approach for estimating marginal tax rates (MTRs). MTRs are of particular interest to fi scal policy-makers because it is generally believed that they are infl uential drivers of economic activity. An important niche in the voluminous literature on taxes and economic growth is concerned with distinguishing the effects of marginal from average tax rates. Examples from the international growth literature include Garrison and Lee (1992) , Easterly and Rebelo (1993) , Padovano and Galli (2002) , and Myles (2009) . Examples from the literature on the growth of U.S. states include Mullen and Williams (1994) , Becsi (1996) , Yamarik (2000) , and Poulson and Kaplan (2008) .
All of these studies employ a procedure for estimating MTRs that was developed by Koester and Kormendi (1989, henceforth K&K) in their seminal study of cross-country growth. K&K use annual observations of income and tax revenues to calculate a single MTR value for a particular jurisdiction s and time period t = 1,2,…T by estimating the following regression specifi cation, Commonly, these MTR estimates are then used as explanatory variables in subsequent growth regressions. A secondary application of K&K's MTR regression is to estimate the income elasticity of tax revenues. If a jurisdiction's MTR is greater than its average tax rate (ATR), tax revenues are elastic with respect to income.
1 Such reasoning has led researchers such as Becsi (1996) and Crain (2003) to conclude that most state tax systems are income elastic.
2 Other studies, using the same methodology but different time periods, conclude that state tax systems are moderately inelastic (e.g., Mullen and Williams, 1994) .
There are three well-recognized defi ciencies of the K&K approach for estimating MTRs. First, the K&K approach produces a single MTR value for an entire time period. Thus, it cannot be used as an explanatory variable in panel studies of economic growth with fi xed effects. Second, the K&K approach assumes that the tax structures of the respective jurisdictions remain constant over the respective time period. This assumption is demonstrably false, though the practical signifi cance of its violation is unknown. Third, the associated MTR estimates are not explicitly related to a jurisdiction's statutory tax parameters. This paper presents a simple generalization of the K&K approach that consists of adding statutory tax variables to (1). It is straightforward to show that this addresses all three defi ciencies above. Our approach allows us to take advantage of available statutory tax data, is easy to implement, and includes the K&K procedure as a nested case. While it in principle applies equally to country and state studies, data limitations will make it most applicable to the latter. Accordingly, we use data from U.S. states from 1977-2004 to estimate state-specifi c, time-varying MTRs. We demonstrate that the inclusion of statutory tax parameters results in MTR estimates substantially different from those generated by the K&K procedure. In addition, we address the possibility that revenues and income are nonstationary, something ignored in previous research employing the K&K approach.
Our study proceeds as follows. Section II discusses the relationship between K&K-type MTR regressions and the literature on the income elasticity of tax revenues. Section III presents our procedure for estimating MTRs. It highlights some of the details associated with its implementation, including how nonstationarity affects the interpretation of MTR estimates. Section IV summarizes our data and discusses the statutory tax variables employed in our analysis. Section V presents our MTR estimates. Section VI concludes.
II. RELATED LITERATURE
The K&K approach to estimating MTRs is related to the extensive literature on the income elasticity of tax revenues. Like K&K, this literature is concerned with estimating a relationship between revenues and income. Unlike the empirical specifi cation of (1), this literature typically estimates that relationship using a constant-elasticity specifi cation, Of course, the linear specifi cation of (1) can also be used to construct an income-varying measure of the income elasticity of tax revenues, η st = MTR s /ATR st .
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There are several reasons why one would want to estimate this kind of relationship. Tax elasticities are useful for forecasting the responses of revenues to expected income changes (Holcombe and Sobel, 1997) . These responses can be focused on particular types of tax revenues (e.g., personal income taxes, sales taxes) or on total tax revenues. 4 The response of total tax revenues to income is particularly pertinent to the literature on tax structure and the growth of government. If overall tax collections are income elastic, and expenditures are driven by tax collections, then the public sector will disproportionately expand with income growth (Feenberg and Rosen, 1987; Payne, 2003) . Like K&K, most of these studies are forced to assume a constant tax structure over the estimation period, though efforts are sometimes made to adjust elasticities for changes in tax parameters (Sen, 2002) .
Although the tax revenue income elasticity and MTR literatures have much in common, they differ in one important respect. The ultimate goal of the income elasticity literature is the estimation of the revenue-income relationship, while the MTR literature primarily views this relationship as an input towards subsequent estimation of the effect of taxes on economic activity.
III. A PROCEDURE FOR ESTIMATING STATE-SPECIFIC, TIME-VARYING MTRS

A. The Basic K&K Specifi cation
The following discussion focuses on estimating MTRs for U.S. states. The K&K approach to estimating MTRs can be represented by the regression specifi cation: where D s is a dummy variable that equals one for state s and zero otherwise, and tax revenues and income refer to total state and local tax revenues and some measure of state income (e.g., personal income). State-specifi c MTRs are measured by the respective income slope coeffi cients.
To this basic specifi cation we add statutory tax variables, X, 
The subsequent discussion explores how this MTR equation can be further refi ned. It also addresses a number of associated specifi cation and estimation issues.
B. Selection of Variables
Statutory Tax Variables
It is useful to divide the sources of tax revenues into personal income (PIT), corporate income (CIT), general sales (ST), property (PT), and other (OT) tax revenues. There are obvious diffi culties in characterizing each of these taxes with one or just a few statutory parameters. For example, while sales taxes generally consist of a single rate for all expenditures, defi nitions of the associated tax base are subject to various exemptions (e.g., food, medical, services) and these differ across states.
Personal income taxes pose a particular challenge because deductions, credits, tax rate schedules, and defi nitions of taxable income vary widely across states. In this respect, we are greatly aided by the NBER TAXSIM program (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993) . In addition to reporting selected maximum rates, the TAXSIM program allows calculation of "average marginal tax rates" for a number of different income sources (e.g., wage income, interest income, capital gains income, etc.). These provide a convenient mapping from a complex personal income tax structure to a relatively small number of tax parameters.
Our empirical analysis investigates a large number and variety of statutory tax variables. We discuss these in greater detail below.
Other Control Variables
One can include additional control variables in the specifi cation of (5). Possible candidates are time trend/dummy, population, and income inequality variables. If these are interacted with income, they will also appear in the specifi cation of (6). Previous studies that have used the K&K approach have overwhelmingly excluded other control variables. In the work that we report, we use the basic K&K type regression specifi cation to facilitate comparison with that work.
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C. Pooled Regression versus Separate State Regressions
Equations (4) This has implications for the interpretation of the pooled regression coeffi cients. Unlike the state-specifi c Income coeffi cients (represented by the β 1, s s), the statutory tax parameter coeffi cients (the β 2 s and β 3 s) represent average effects across all states. This averaging serves a useful purpose. The combination of a limited number of observations per state and infrequent changes in some of the tax parameters over the sample period can produce spurious correlations. For example, it is possible that a state makes a small change in its sales tax rate at the same time that it experiences a very large increase in sales tax revenues, producing a large but spurious estimate of the effect of that tax variable on revenues. Accordingly, our approach pools observations across states while allowing a substantial amount of state-specifi c interaction terms. This enables us to incorporate potentially important changes in tax policies while at the same time minimizing the risk of spurious correlations from individual states. Underlying this pooling strategy is the assumption that the experience of all states provides information about the relationship between the respective tax parameters and tax revenues for any one state.
D. Separate Regressions for Each Revenue Source versus Combined Regression
An advantage of estimating separate regressions for each revenue source is that it allows one to identify the relative contributions to the overall MTR of the different tax types. 6 Another issue is whether one should include all statutory tax parameters in each of the revenue source equations. For example, if corporate income taxes increase, some businesses may choose to re-organize themselves as partnerships or Subchapter S corporations. This would shift business income from the corporate to the personal income tax base. Indeed, such shifting is reported to have occurred as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2009) . However, including a large number of statutory tax variables in each of the individual revenue source equations creates the risk of estimating spurious correlations. This raises challenging variable selection issues. 7 The results we report below choose to ignore these fi scal externalities, but this can easily be addressed in future work by including additional tax variables in the respective equations.
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Estimating separate regressions for each revenue source produces the following revenue equation for tax type i, state s, and fi scal year t:
where i = PIT, CIT, ST, PT, and OT, identifying the respective tax type. The corresponding MTR for tax type i is given by:
The overall MTR for state s at time t is obtained by summing across all fi ve tax types:
E. Nonstationarity
Another concern is that revenues and income may be nonstationary, which could cause conventional regression specifi cations to measure spurious relationships. 9 The 6 An additional benefi t is that it allows the individual MTR components to be included as separate explanatory variables in economic growth equations (Yamarik, 2000; Gemmell, Kneller, and Sanz, 2008) . 7 It is a well-known principle in forecasting that the inclusion of "too many" variables can result in poor forecasts. Model selection criteria such as adjusted R-squared, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), and Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) address this problem by penalizing the inclusion of additional variables via a "penalty function" (Reed, 2009 ). 8 For example, corporate income tax parameters could be included in the equation for personal income tax revenues. Likewise, personal income tax parameters could be included in the corporate income tax equation. 9 We thank William Gentry for emphasizing the implication of nonstationarity for our estimates.
fact that tax liabilities are generated as a function of income and/or consumption -for example, via personal income tax schedules -provides a strong theoretical argument against spurious regression. Without exception, previous studies estimating K&K-type MTR regressions have used levels of revenues and income in their regression specifi cations. However, if one or more of the variables are nonstationary, then the appropriate specifi cation is an error correction model (ECM). Note that an ECM model may be appropriate even if the variables are stationary. If the variables are cointegrated, then (7) represents a long-run (LR) equilibrium relationship. The state-year MTR estimates are then interpreted as the LR equilibrium MTRs that would exist if the associated tax parameters stayed constant at their respective state-year values. We fi nd strong evidence in support of the ECM and thus interpret our MTR estimates as LR MTRs.
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F. Choice of an Income Distribution for Estimating Personal Income Tax Parameters
In order to calculate average marginal tax rates, the NBER TAXSIM model uses specifi c income distributions. The model allows three options. One option constructs separate income distributions for each state and year. A second option constructs separate income distributions for each state (using 1995 as the benchmark year), but holds this distribution constant over time. A third option constructs a nationally representative income distribution and uses this for all states and years. The choice of which income distribution to use depends on the ultimate goal of the research.
A major concern in studies of taxes and economic growth is that taxes are endogenous. For example, if MTRs are increasing in income, then this will produce a bias towards fi nding a positive correlation between MTRs and economic growth. Therefore, if the ultimate goal is to estimate the relationship between state taxes and economic activity, one should use the third option described above, because the associated income distribution is largely independent of any one state's tax policy. Feenberg and Rosen (1987) adopt this approach in their study of tax structure and public sector growth, and our analysis below does the same.
IV. DATA AND VARIABLES
Our data include all 50 states over the years 1977-2004, excluding 2001 and 2003 since state and local fi scal data are not available for these years.
12 This limits our sample to a maximum of 1300 total observations. Table 1 reports shares of total tax revenues by type of tax over the sample period. Property taxes comprise the largest share of total state and 10 The corresponding empirical analysis is available from the authors. 11 We note that recent papers on the income elasticity of taxes are mixed with respect to whether they address nonstationarity. For example, Gupta, et al. (2009) and Garrett and Coughlin (2009) ignore nonstationarity, while Nichols and Tosun (2008) address it. Sobel and Holcombe (1996) report little difference in estimates of the LR equilibrium relationship between revenues and income between these two approaches. 12 The tax and revenue data come from US Census Government Finances Historical Data. These are available for state and local governments in 1972, and then from 1977 onward.
local tax revenues (30.3 percent), followed by sales taxes (23.5 percent), other taxes (23.3 percent), personal income taxes (18.5 percent), and corporate income taxes (4.3 percent). Some of the states do not collect revenues from all sources; this is refl ected as minimum values of zero in Table 1 . Our estimation procedure omits states that do not use a particular revenue source because these states do not contribute information about the relationship between revenues, income, and tax parameters. For example, the seven states that had no PIT revenue during this period (Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming) were excluded when estimating the PIT revenue equation.
13 A similar procedure was followed in estimating the CIT and ST regressions.
14 For state income we use personal income data based on fi scal year -as opposed to calendar year -to appropriately match income with tax revenue data. Most studies use annual data on state personal income (or GSP) in revenue-income regressions. This causes a mismatch between the left-hand-side variables (tax revenues are calculated over fi scal years) and right-hand-side variables (personal income is based on calendar years). We use quarterly Bureau of Economic Analysis data to construct an annual personal income variable that matches the state's fi scal year.
We made exhaustive efforts to assemble data on as many statutory tax parameters as possible for each tax revenue component. Our efforts were hindered by the diversity in the statutory tax laws, the need to collect historical data, and the lack of centralized collection location for the various types of taxes and tax structures. Nevertheless, we did succeed in collecting data on most of the pertinent tax parameters for each type of tax for each state and year in our analysis. These are listed and briefl y described in Table 2 . 13 Alaska had a personal income tax for the fi rst two years of the sample (1977 and 1978) . We chose to omit these observations in the estimation of the PIT equation. 14 Nevada, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming do not have corporate income taxes. Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon do not have sales taxes. Prior to 2008, Texas had a "Franchise Tax," the revenues from which were mainly drawn from a formula based on the federal CIT (Texas Comptroller, 2002) . We thank an anonymous reviewer for this clarifi cation. (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) Taxation of machinery compiled by Due and Mikesell (1983,1994); (1977 -1981 -2004 As discussed above, the statutory tax parameters associated with the personal income tax (PIT) are derived from the NBER TAXSIM model (Feenberg and Coutts, 1993) and consist of two sets of variables: (1) MTRs averaged over the distribution of taxpayers (MTR_WAGES, MTR_INTEREST, MTR_DIVIDENDS, MTR_CAPGAINS, MTR_MORTGAGE, and MTR_PENSION) , and (2) maximum tax rates (MAX_WAGES, and MAX_CAPGAINS).
Our data include two statutory tax parameters for the corporate income tax: the maximum rate (MAX_CRATE) and the number of tax brackets (NUMBER_CBRACKETS). Assuming a positive tax rate elasticity, we expect that the number of tax brackets will be negatively related to CIT revenues when the maximum rate is held constant.
We collected fi ve statutory tax parameters for the sales tax (ST). These consist of the state general sales tax rate (RATE_SALES), the state tax rate on food (RATE_FOOD), 15 and three variables that characterize the sales tax base. EXTENT_SERVICESTAXED is a count variable that tracks the number of service good categories included in the state sales tax base.
16 EXTENT_MACHINERY1 and EXTENT_MACHINERY2 are dummy variables that identify whether machinery is taxed broadly or narrowly, respectively.
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The statutory treatment of property taxes (PT) is characterized by four parameters. We collected state effective property rates (RATE_PROPERTY) from a yearly survey of the largest cities in each state conducted by the District of Columbia Offi ce of Revenue Analysis. The effective rate is calculated as the product of the nominal rate and the assessment level expressed per $100. Given the infeasibility of collecting effective tax rates for all localities, these are collected only for the largest city in each state. 18 The rates do not measure the state-wide average nor do they necessarily refl ect the property tax rate for the median household within or across states. They also do not incorporate the variety of exemptions and credits that affect the taxable property tax base. 19 Although there are obvious, trade-offs associated with using the DC nationwide comparisons, they offer the advantages of being available on an annual basis, and of incorporating assessment values rather than income or population as measures of the tax base. Fur-15 Seven of the states (Connecticut, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont) that exempt food also exempt clothing. The RATE_FOOD variable also captures the clothing exemption. 16 Table 2 contains the source and information about the 164 service categories. The 164 services are organized into eight groups: utilities; personal services; business services; computer services; admissions and amusements; professional services; fabrication; repair and installation; and other services. 17 The coeffi cient on narrow machinery taxation is expected to be positive (higher marginal tax rate than no taxation of machinery -the omitted category), but smaller than the coeffi cient on broad taxation of machinery. See Merriman and Skidmore (2000) for a discussion of these variables and a more extensive discussion of the distortionary nature of sales tax parameters. 18 According to Bell and Kirschner (2009) , only thirteen states provide information on effective property rates (Table 9 , p. 130). 19 Bell and Kirschner (2009) provide a thorough discussion of the available measures of effective property tax rates. The only other comprehensive series available is by the Minnesota Tax Association, which calculates effective rates for median priced homes and accounts for property tax relief. The MTA estimates, however, are only available periodically (1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2005 We also include variables indicating whether a state limits growth in assessment rates (LIMIT_ASSESSGROWTH), limits property tax rates by specifi c entities such as school districts (LIMIT_SPECIFICRATE), and limits the growth rate of property tax liabilities (LIMIT_REVGROWTH). LIMIT_ASSESSGROWTH and LIMIT_SPECIFICRATE are interacted in the regression specifi cation. Table 3 presents a summary of our fi nal regression equations for each revenue source, as specifi ed in (7). 21 Given that we fi nd strong evidence in favour of an error correction specifi cation, these equations should be interpreted as the LR equilibrium relationships between the variables; and the associated MTRs should be interpreted as LR MTRs.
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V. DISCUSSION OF MTR RESULTS
A. Core Results for Tax Revenue Regressions
Variables with insignifi cant coeffi cients were dropped from the specifi cation unless there was a particular interest in certain kinds of tax parameters. 22, 23 However, as we discuss below, the only two tax variables that appear to have a substantial impact on overall MTRs are the average marginal tax rate on wage income (MTR_WAGES) and the overall sales tax rate (RATE_SALES). Note that each regression equation uses a different number of observations, because some states do not implement the particular revenue source and because of missing data. 24 For the sake of brevity, the table only reports the estimates of the statutory tax rate-income interaction variables, since these are the only tax variables that matter for generating the MTRs. Also included in these regressions are state dummy and state dummy-income interaction variables, along with statutory, non-rate tax variables. 25 20 During periods of housing price increases, property tax rate limits alone are ineffective at constraining property tax revenue growth. However, rate limits coupled with assessment growth limits can be very restrictive. Accordingly, we interact the assessment growth limit variable with the rate limit variable since both are essential for determining property tax liabilities over time. See Skidmore (1999) for a more detailed discussion. An additional variable characterizing limitations on overall property rates had to be dropped because of perfect multicollinearity with other included variables. 21 The OT regression equation is not reported since it does not include any statutory tax variables. 22 Variables with insignifi cant coeffi cients were retained in some cases to allow comparison of the relative impacts on MTRs of the different variables (e.g., see discussion on impact of MTR_WAGES compared to MTR_CAPGAINS and MTR_MORTGAGE below). 23 The literature on variable selection is voluminous and, unfortunately, there is no consensus on the best way to select variables (see Reed (2009) , and the references therein). 24 Property tax rates were not available for some of the states from 1977-1980, and state and local tax revenue data were unavailable for all states for 2001 and 2003. 25 The set of regression results are available from the authors upon request. Notes: This table summarizes the results from estimating Equation (7) in the text. We only report the TAX VARIABLE × INCOME interaction variables because these are the only tax variables that matter for the calculation of MTRs. All regression specifi cations also include state dummy, state dummy × INCOME interactions, and other control variables. Regressions are estimated using Weighted Least Squares to address heteroscedasticity, with weights set equal to the reciprocal of the square root of INCOME. Standard errors are robust to serial correlation. The R-squared and Adjusted R-squared values are those from the unweighted regression equations.
In assessing the reliability of these regression results, we note that the regression equations generally produce good fi ts, with R 2 values 97 percent or higher. Even without the fi xed effects, the overall R 2 values are quite high. 26 The product of the estimated coeffi cient and the associated tax variable should be interpreted as the change in the respective tax revenues resulting from a dollar increase in state personal income. For example, if we evaluate the coeffi cient on MTR_WAGES × INCOME at the sample average for MTR_WAGES, a dollar increase in state personal income is estimated to increase LR PIT revenues by approximately 1.7 cents (0.003946 × 4.20 = 0.017) via taxation on wage income.
The relative sizes of the coeffi cients are in line with expectations: one would expect a percentage point increase in the tax rate on wages (MTR_WAGES) to have a larger impact on PIT revenues than a percentage point increase in the tax rate on capital gains or a percentage point decrease in the tax subsidy for mortgage interest (MTR_CAPGAINS, MTR_MORTGAGE). Likewise, one would expect a percentage point increase in the general sales tax (RATE_SALES) to have a larger impact on total ST revenues than the same increase on food (RATE_FOOD).
A potentially serious econometric issue is that the policy variables included in our analyses are endogenously determined. For example, states experiencing rapid growth in property tax revenues are likely to be the same states that support legislation to restrain property taxes. Similarly, states experiencing disappointing growth in sales tax revenues may respond by increasing rates and/or expanding the coverage of their sales tax regimes. In addition, states with large increases in taxable revenues are also more likely to cut tax rates (Poterba, 1994) . The issue of endogeneity is diffi cult to overcome. In our case we are hamstrung by a lack of good instruments to determine whether endogeneity is present, and if so, to use in appropriate econometric methods.
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The presence of endogeneity is likely to cause our estimates in Table 3 to be conservative estimates of the effects of statutory tax variables on LR MTRs. We expect the bias to be in the opposite direction of the true tax effects. For example, the endogeneity bias associated with MTR_WAGES should be negative if states with increasing taxable incomes are more likely to lower tax rates (Poterba, 1994) . This would make the true value of the MTR_WAGES coeffi cient larger than the estimated value reported in Table  3 . This is also true for the other statutory tax rate coeffi cients reported in Table 3 . In this sense, our results can be thought of representing lower bound estimates of the effects of tax policy parameters on LR MTRs: correctly-signed coeffi cients are biased towards zero. Future research may be able to fashion a better solution to the endogeneity problem. In the meantime, we believe our methodology represents a substantial improvement on the K&K approach, which implicitly sets all statutory tax coeffi cients equal to zero. 26 R 2 values for the Ordinary Least Squares models with income and the statutory tax variables, but without fi xed effects, ranged from 85 percent (for the corporate income tax equation) to 96 percent (for the personal income tax equation). 27 For a good survey of some of the econometric issues, see Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) .
B. State-and Year-specifi c MTR Estimates
We use (8) and (9) to calculate state-and year-specifi c MTRs.
28 Table 4 summarizes the distribution of estimates. The mean and median values of the overall MTR are 10.45 percent and 10.28 percent, respectively. The individual values range from a minimum of 7.93 percent to a maximum of 15.23 percent. We discuss the state-by-state results in more detail below.
Panel B of Table 4 decomposes the level of MTRs by revenue source. Overall, the respective MTR shares are similar to their shares of overall tax revenues (Table 1) . However, these MTR shares mask much of the heterogeneity across states. For example, MTRs for PIT and ST are as low as zero in states that do not use these revenue sources, and as high as 5.6 percent (New York) and 5.1 percent (Washington), respectively. MTR PT ranges from a low of 1.3 percent (Alabama) to a high of 6.2 percent (Maine), and MTR OT ranges from 1.0 percent (Massachusetts) to 5.2 percent (Delaware).
A different story emerges if we decompose changes in MTRs. Panel C of Table 4 reports mean and median values of the annual change of the respective MTR components which have time-varying statutory components.
29 Changes in MTR PIT contribute the largest share of annual movement in overall MTRs. The average of the absolute value of the annual change in MTR PIT is 0.051 percent which is approximately three times larger than the next largest contributor, the sales tax. The difference is striking given that both tax types make roughly equal contributions to the level of MTRs (Panel B).
The reason for this discrepancy is that state sales tax policies change much less frequently than the personal income tax parameters. The median of the absolute value of annual changes in MTR ST is zero; i.e., no change (Panel C). A similar story holds for property taxes. Thus, while all the tax types except corporate income taxes contribute substantially to differences in the estimated MTRs across states, most of the movement of MTRs within states over time is due to changes in PIT parameters.
C. Comparison of MTR estimates with K&K
The inclusion of statutory tax variables makes a substantial difference in LR MTR estimates. For each state over all years, we calculate the average value of the absolute difference between our MTR estimates and those derived from the K&K procedure. For 27 (out of 50) states, this average difference is larger than the standard deviation of estimated MTR values. 30 For 12 states, it is larger than two standard deviations. 28 While these are LR MTRs, they are "year-specifi c" in the sense that they represent the LR MTRs associated with the set of statutory tax parameters in place for that year. 29 Note that the change in MTR OT is always zero, since it employs no time-varying, statutory tax information. 30 We calculated standard deviation as the standard error of a regression in which the dependent variable was the MTR estimates and the explanatory variables consisted of state dummy variables. The bold, solid line in Figure 1 reports our MTR estimates for selected states. MTR estimates from the K&K procedure are represented by a bold, dotted line; a two-standard deviation band is indicated around the K&K estimates with light, dotted lines. Note that some states have missing MTR values for the years 1977-1980 due to the unavailability of property tax rates for these years and states.
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The fi rst two graphs in Figure 1 display MTRs for New Hampshire and South Dakota. These states had the smallest average, absolute difference between the two MTR estimates. As the fi gures show, the two sets of estimates are virtually indistinguishable. They represent one end of the spectrum. The comparison between K&K's and our estimates of Wyoming's MTRs is illuminating. K&K obtain a high MTR for Wyoming because their MTR is driven by the overall high correlation between total tax revenues and income. We suspect that oil prices play an important role here (when oil prices increase, the economy booms and extractive tax revenues increase). We obtain a much lower MTR than K&K because our approach does not allow income to affect the MTR on personal or corporate income, as Wyoming does not have a personal income or corporate income tax. We believe this highlights one of the advantages of our approach: in the case of the oil industries, the increased revenues derived from oil production does not refl ect a corresponding increase in the tax rate, but rather higher prices in the national market.
32 Therefore, it would be misleading to infer a high "MTR on income" for Wyoming taxpayers just because income and revenues are highly correlated.
To better appreciate the impact in the middle of the spectrum, we sort states by average absolute difference between MTR and MTR (K&K) estimates. The associated median states are Maine and Tennessee. In the case of Maine, the MTR estimates generally lie above the K&K estimate. In the case of Tennessee, they generally lie below it.
Much of the within-state movement in MTRs is driven by changes in two tax policy parameters: (1) the TAXSIM-generated variable, MTR_WAGES, working through MTR PIT , and (2) the state sales tax variable, RATE_SALES, working through MTR ST . The next four fi gures in Figure 1 demonstrate how changes in statutory tax parameters map into changes in estimated MTR estimates.
For example, the sharp increase in Connecticut's MTRs in the early 1990s can be traced to changes in its income tax code. Connecticut's income tax was broadened in 1991 to include wages, at an initial tax rate of 1.5 percent. This rate tripled the following year to 4.5 percent. In contrast, Illinois provides an example where an abrupt change in its MTR is related to its sales tax. In 1990, Illinois increased its sales tax rate from 5.0 percent to 6.25 percent, effective January 1, 1991.
A large increase in Kentucky's MTR from 1990 to 1991 can be attributed to simultaneous changes in both its income and sales tax rates. The deduction of federal income taxes on state income tax returns was eliminated in 1991. At the same time, the sales tax was increased from 5 to 6 percent in 1991. Finally, North Carolina provides an example of a number of tax changes that combined to increase its MTR from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. North Carolina had major tax reform in 1989. The federal income tax was adopted as a starting point to calculate North Carolina obligations. Changes to the tax brackets amounted to a tax increase and the rate structure was streamlined to include just two rates: 6 percent and 7 percent. In 1991, the state faced budget diffi culties and 32 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the complexity of tax incidence for extractive industries.
For a detailed analysis of tax incidence associated with energy resources, see Morgan and Mutti (1981) .
added a third rate of 7.75 percent. In 1992, the state sales tax rate was increased from 3 to 4 percent.
D. Evaluating Proxies for Time-varying MTRs
The preceding discussion highlights an advantage of our procedure: it allows changes in estimated MTRs to be directly linked to changes in underlying statutory tax parameters. Previous studies attempt to capture such movements using proxies. Two standard proxies for time-varying MTRs are (1) the top, marginal, personal income tax rate, and (2) the change in tax burden (Mullen and Williams, 1994) . 33 To assess how well these proxies correlate with our estimated MTR values, we calculate simple correlations for the respective pairs of variables. The associated correlations between our MTR estimates and the top marginal personal income tax rates are 0.52 and 0.62, depending upon whether state fi xed effects are partialled out or not, respectively. In other words, approximately two-thirds to three-fourths of the variance in our estimated MTRs cannot be "explained" by changes in the top, marginal, personal income tax rate. 34 Whether this qualifi es the latter to be an acceptable proxy is questionable. In contrast, changes in tax burden are very poorly correlated with our estimated timevarying MTRs. The simple correlations without and with adjustments for fi xed effects are 0.05 and 0.08, respectively. Clearly, this variable should not be used as a proxy for state-specifi c MTRs in a panel setting. This supports Reed and Rogers' (2006) conclusion that tax burden measures do a poor job of capturing changes in state tax policy.
E. State MTR rankings
Understanding the precise nature of the theoretical and empirical links between tax policy and economic growth continues to stimulate research efforts (Feldstein, 2002) . State policy makers pay particular attention to their tax burden rankings, which are readily available. In contrast, accurate measures of MTRs -which come closer to refl ecting the rates that affect behavioral responses to policy decisions -have been elusive. Both the absolute and relative ranks of MTRs across states are useful for gaining such insights. Accordingly, we present state-level MTR estimates from our analysis. Given the substantial changes in MTRs over time, we focus on the last fi ve years of our sample, 2000-2004. Previous research has claimed a link between MTRs and economic growth (Mullen and Williams, 1994; Becsi, 1996) . For this and other reasons, knowing both the absolute 33 Tax burden is typically calculated as the ratio of total state and local tax revenues to income, where income is based on the calendar year at that ends during the corresponding fi scal year (Reed and Rogers, 2006 
V. CONCLUSION
This article develops a procedure for estimating state-specifi c, time-varying marginal tax rates (MTRs). It generalizes the time-invariant procedure of Koester and Kormendi (1989) by incorporating state tax policy variables for all fi fty states over the years . We fi nd that the inclusion of statutory tax variables has a substantial impact on estimates of MTRs. Further, we fi nd strong evidence that an error correction model is the appropriate specifi cation when relating tax revenues with its determinants, so that the associated MTRs should be thought of as the long-run revenue impact of a dollar increase in state income.
Our procedure produces estimated MTRs that vary widely across states and years, ranging from a low of 7.9 percent to a high of 15.2 percent. Using data from the last fi ve years of our panel (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) , we rank individual states on the basis of their MTRs. The top fi ve states (in descending order) are New York, Maine, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Wisconsin. The states with the smallest MTRs are Alaska, Wyoming, Tennessee, South Dakota, and Alabama.
To obtain MTRs, we estimate revenue regressions for each of fi ve major tax categories. All of the tax types other than corporate income taxes make a substantial contribution to the level of state MTRs. In contrast, annual changes in MTRs are primarily driven by statutory changes in personal income taxes and, to a lesser degree, by sales and property taxes. A benefi t of our procedure is that it allows one to explicitly link timeseries movement in estimated MTRs to actual changes in state tax policy parameters.
Two proxies for state MTRs that have been employed in economic growth studies are the top marginal income tax bracket and changes in state tax burdens. We fi nd that the fi rst is moderately correlated with our estimated MTRs, while the latter performs very poorly as a proxy.
There are two straightforward directions in which this research can be extended. First, our procedure enables MTRs to be employed in panel studies of economic growth. This should advance the study of the impact of MTRs on aggregate economic activity. Second, there are a number of refi nements, particularly regarding endogeneity and specifi cation issues, that could lead to more reliable estimates of MTRs. 
